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Abstract 
The ban on predatory pricing is a contested subject. Nevertheless, most competition 
law jurisdictions have legislation regarding bans on predatory pricing. This is also the 
case for new competition law regimes. There are two major influences on the way 
predatory pricing is tackled, namely the EU approach and that of the US. This 
dissertation will focus on these two approaches, by studying how the ban on predatory 
pricing is legislated and practiced by the courts in the respective jurisdictions. The aim 
is to define clear rules for the ban on predatory pricing both in the EU and the US, and 
to identify any differences between the two approaches. Furthermore, the ban on 
predatory pricing will be studied through a political and historical lens, in an attempt to 
explain why the ban is practiced the way it is in the respective jurisdictions, and to 
better understand the differences between them. Last, but not least, the dissertation 
will examine which approach is better suited for developing countries implementing 
predatory pricing legislation. The ‘new’ South African Competition Act will be used as 
an example; through an examination of its influences and the effects those influences 
had on the wording of its provisions regarding predatory pricing. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1. Background 
This dissertation explores the topic of predatory pricing generally, and more 
specifically, seeks to compare its differing applications in the EU and the US, with a 
view to determining which approach would be better suited in the case of emerging 
economies such as South Africa. Predatory pricing is a long-standing feature of EU and 
US competition law, and can in a simplistic way, be defined as the way in which a 
business sells its goods at such low prices that other companies can no longer compete 
and are forced to cease selling similar goods.1 In other words, predatory pricing occurs 
when a large firm sets its prices very low, often below its production costs, with the 
intention of forcing competitors out of the market so that it can establish a monopoly-
like position and charge higher prices in the future in an attempt to recoup its losses 
and profit in the long run.2 
As this dissertation will demonstrate, there are several important pre-conditions 
necessary to execute a successful predatory pricing scheme. The most obvious one 
however is that it requires the company attempting a predatory pricing scheme, 
hereafter referred to as the predator, to have a certain amount of market power.3 In 
simple terms, having market power means having the ability to set a higher price, or to 
sell at a lower quality, than the other firms in the market and still be profitable in the 
long run.4 This long term profitability requires that the predator is able to recoup its 
potentially substantial losses after selling its products or services at a deficit.5 
                                                          
1
 Oxford Dictionary, 8th edition. 
2
 Director of Investigation and Research ‘Predatory Pricing Enforcement Guidelines’ (1992). 
3
 This is a direct result of the dominance-requirement in Article 102 TFEU for the EU, and under Section 2 
of the Sherman Act in the US. Ref. sections 2 and 3 of this dissertation. 
4
 See for instance P ‘Nelson Monopoly Power, Market Definition and the Cellophane Fallacy’ at 2.  
5
 As this dissertation will demonstrate, such recoupment is necessary to prove to be found guilty of 
predatory pricing in accordance with Section 2 of the Sherman Act in the US. The EU does not have a 
similar requirement, but it is nevertheless believed that the hope of recoupment is the greatest incentive 
for a company to embark on a predatory pricing strategy. 
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As this dissertation will point out, the ban on predatory pricing is considered by many 
to be controversial.6 Nevertheless, most developed and developing countries 
worldwide have legislation under competition law that prohibits predatory pricing, as it 
is considered to cause harm for competition.7 By far, the two most influential 
authorities on predatory pricing, and indeed competition law in general, are the US and 
the EU. This is a natural consequence of their position as the two most significant trade 
blocks in the world. The two approaches follow two different directions; where the 
European approach can be argued to be quite hands-on with fairly substantial 
interference, the US approach is more Darwinian and interferes less in competition.8 
Other countries’ competition laws are often inspired by one of these approaches, as 
will be demonstrated when assessing the South African approach in section 6.  
This dissertation aims to compare the two approaches, in order to ascertain whether 
there are any theoretical differences and how these differences translate to the 
practical application of the principle. A secondary objective is to try and understand 
and explain these potential differences, and why they exist. Last, but not least, the 
intention is to draw a conclusion as to which approach is better-suited to emerging 
economies implementing competition laws. The regulation of, and influences on the 
South African Competition Act of 1998 will be used as an example in this regard.  
The following sections under this Chapter one will explain why predatory pricing is 
considered to be detrimental for competition,9 and look at some general, essential 
features of predatory pricing,10 in order to provide a better understanding of the 
concept of predatory pricing. 
In Chapter 2, the dissertation will carry out an in-depth analysis of the legislation and 
case law regarding predatory pricing in the EU. The same will be done for the US 
                                                          
6
 See Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
7
 For Article 102 TFEU for the EU; Section 2 of the Sherman Act for the US; Section 8(d)(iv) of the 
Competition Act 89 of 1998 for South Africa; § 46(1) of the Trade Practices Act for Australia; Article 
21(18) of law 8884 of June 11, 1994 for Brazil; § 4(2)(ii) of the Competition Act, 2002, No. 12 of 2003 for 
India; etc. 
8
 See elaboration in Article 2 to 4 of this dissertation. 
9
 Section 1.2 
10
 Section 1.3 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
3 
 
approach in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 will summarize and evaluate the most important 
differences, and explain these differences in an economic and political perspective. 
Since the regulation of predatory pricing is a contested one,11 Chapter 5 will focus on 
the most common skepticism directed at the ban of this pricing scheme.  
Finally, Chapter 6 of the dissertation will draw study the ban on predatory pricing in 
South Africa, and draw conclusions as to which approach is better suited for, and has 
influenced, emerging economies such as South Africa. 
 
1.2. Why is predatory pricing considered harmful for competition? 
It is a common notion that competition laws exist to protect competition, and not the 
competitors themselves. Competition is desirable and worthy of protection because of 
its numerous advantages. First and foremost, competition promotes what is known as 
consumer welfare. ‘Consumer welfare’, in this context, refers to the benefits that 
accrue to individuals as a result of the utilization of goods and services.12 Consumer 
welfare is enhanced through competition because competition encourages 
manufacturers and service providers to be more efficient13 by way of better responding 
to the needs of their customers, as well as encouraging them to be innovative, to 
initiate and to venture.14 In other words, competition forces the competitors to 
optimize their resources, which leads to increased consumer welfare through lower 
prices and better quality.15  
                                                          
11
 See for instance J McGee ’Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case’ Journal of law and 
Economics 1 (April 1958): 13760, H Demsetz ’Barriers to Entry’ American Economic Review 72 (May 
1982), F Easterbrook ‘Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies’(1981) University of Chicago Law 
Review 48, T J DiLorenzo, ‘The Myth of Predatory Pricing’ (February 1992) Cato Policy Analysis No. 169.  
12
 Definition from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).  
13
 ‘Efficiency’ in this sense is defined as the total gains of trade. 
14
 S Vaknin ‘Competition Laws’.  
15
 Ibid. 
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Moreover, competition also gets rid of the failures through a natural elimination 
process; in order to survive in a competitive market, the competitors need to 
constantly improve and become more efficient, or risk losing out.16 
From a macroeconomic perspective, competition is desirable because it ensures that 
the resources are allocated and exploited in an efficient way.  This will in turn generate 
benefits for consumers by guaranteeing that they pay the lowest possible price, while 
still retaining the highest possible standard, of goods and services.17  Competition laws 
are made to protect this unfettered competition. 
There is a broad consensus that predatory pricing can have a detrimental effect on 
competition, and is consequently illegal in many jurisdictions. For instance, harm could 
occur if a company prices its goods or services so low that it would be unprofitable for 
competitors to stay in the market, and then increases prices to supra-competitive 
levels for a significant period of time afterwards. 18 A potential short term benefit for 
the consumer while the predatory pricing is ongoing can thus turn into an overall loss 
in the long run after the competition has been eliminated or substantially reduced.19 
Furthermore, competition authorities worry that predatory pricing may eventually lead 
to monopolies or monopoly-like situations, where a company has virtually no 
competitors.20 Monopolies are undesirable and considered bad for competition 
because they restrict free trade, preventing the setting of prices by the market itself.21 
In other words, a company holding a monopoly can, to a great extent, dictate the 
market, and is free to charge higher prices and lower quality than in a competitive 
market. This will lead to a less efficient use of the resources, and a reduction in 
consumer welfare. 
                                                          
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Areeda & Hovenkamp Antitrust Law 2ed (2002) at 272. 
19
 Sherman Act Section 2 Joint Hearing: ‘Predatory Pricing’ (22 June 2006) Hr’g Tr. 30. 
20
 The fear of monopoly is explicitly reflected in the ban on predatory pricing in the US, where the ban on 
predatory pricing is found under the ban on attempt to monopolize in section2 of the Sherman Act.  
21
 K Amadeo ‘Monopoly’ available at http://useconomy.about.com/od/glossary/g/monopoly.htm.   
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With this in mind, it is hard to imagine motives for profit-maximizing companies to 
pursue a predatory pricing scheme other than a desire to drive competitors out of the 
market, or prevent new competitors from entering the market.22  
 
It is the competition authorities’ role to draw the line between legal competitive 
behavior and predatory pricing. As this dissertation will later demonstrate,23 the criteria 
for predatory pricing differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. There are, however, some 
key features that are essential to predatory pricing in general. These will be further 
elaborated on in the next section. 
 
1.3. Essential features of predatory pricing 
As this dissertation will argue, there are differences between the EU and US way of 
regulating and practicing the ban on predatory pricing. There are, however, some key 
features that are essential to predatory pricing in general and thus common to both 
approaches.24  
First and foremost, the market structure must allow for predatory pricing in the 
situation in question. In other words, an assessment of the market concentration must 
be undertaken. ‘Market concentration’ refers to the number and the size of the 
participants in the market. In order to execute a predatory pricing scheme, the 
predator must have a dominant position in the market, and there must be a limited 
number of competitors. A market where these properties exist is a concentrated 
market. The more concentrated the market is, the more likely the possibility of a 
successful predatory pricing scheme. 
A feature of a concentrated market is the presence of entry barriers. If there are low 
entry barriers to the market, there is a relatively high possibility that new competitors 
                                                          
22
 This was also the stance taken by the court in the EU case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission 
section 71. See also section 3.2.1. of this dissertation. 
23
 See for instance comparison of EU and US approach in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
24
 This section is loosely based on V Siraj ‘It’s all dominance that’s crucial in Predatory Pricing’ available at 
http://www.legalserviceindia.com/article/l267-Predatory-Pricing.html. 
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will enter the market once the old competitor is driven out.25 As a result, a dominant 
company will be reluctant to commit to predatory pricing no matter how strong a 
position it holds in a market; if there is a high possibility for new companies to establish 
themselves in the market, it will experience difficulties in recouping its losses, and 
predatory pricing is unlikely to be worth the risk. 
Another important feature necessary for predatory pricing is excessive capacity. When 
reducing prices in order to take over the competitor’s customers or clients, the 
predator must be able to produce items or supply enough services to meet the 
market’s demand.26 If the predator does not have this excess capacity it would not be 
able to absorb the competitors’ business effectively and, as a consequence, the 
predatory pricing scheme would not be successful. 
Furthermore, the predator must have deep pockets. Simply put, the predator must 
have the economic muscles necessary to pull off a predatory pricing strategy.27 Only 
companies with large financial reserves, capable of losing money for a considerable 
amount of time from selling their products or services at a lower price than its average 
variable costs,28 or at least below their average total costs, will have a chance to 
succeed.  
Lastly, the predator must be able to recoup its losses once its competitors are driven 
out of the market. Recoupment in this sense means the ability to regain the short term 
losses from the excessive pricing once it has obtained a monopoly-like position in the 
market.29 Without the possibility of recouping its losses, the predatory pricing would be 
senseless. As this dissertation will demonstrate, different jurisdictions have different 
requirements when it comes to proof of recoupment.  Despite the differing practices 
when considering possible recoupment, both jurisdictions nevertheless seem to 
acknowledge that possible recoupment is an important incentive for the company 
                                                          
25
 Ibid., paragraph 5. 
26
 Ibid., paragraph 6. 
27
 Ibid., paragraph 7. 
28
 See section 2.2.1 of this dissertation for more details. 
29
 Supra n. 24 paragraph 8. 
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undertaking a predatory pricing scheme. Hence, this feature is, in this context, a 
particularly important one.30 
The features mentioned above are only likely to be possessed by companies who have 
a dominant position in the relevant market. Thus, dominant position is also listed 
explicitly as a necessary condition in EU competition law. This is not the case in the US, 
although practically speaking it is also a prerequisite for predatory pricing here.31 
Although these prerequisites are jurisdiction-unspecific, there are, as this dissertation 
will demonstrate, a couple of significant differences in the regulation of the ban on 
predatory pricing. Consequently, the following section, focusing on the EU, will carry 
out an in-depth analysis of how the ban on predatory pricing is regulated by law, and 
how this regulation is practiced by the courts. The same will be done for the US in 
chapter 3. Chapter 4 will compare the two and identify the differences in the treatment 
of the ban, and the reasoning behind these differences. Eventually, the conclusions 
from these analyses will be used to ascertain their influences on the regulation of 
predatory pricing in the South Africa. 
 
2. PREDATORY PRICING IN THE EU 
2.1. Article 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
The ban on predatory pricing in the EU is regulated by Article 102 TFEU.32 This article in 
its entirety reads: 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible 
with the common market insofar as it may affect trade between Member 
States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist of: 
                                                          
30
 See Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
31
 Section 4.1 of this dissertation. 
32
 Article 102 TFEU is the same as the previous Article 82 (and before that, Article 86) of the EC-treaty. 
For the sake of consistency, this dissertation will refer to Article 102 TFEU regardless of the time frame 
and thus Article, under which the respective cases were reviewed.  
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(a) Directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other 
unfair trading conditions; 
 
(b) Limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; 
 
(c) Applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
 
(d) Making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
 
Of most relevance here is paragraph (a), since predatory pricing is considered an unfair 
pricing strategy. There are two prerequisites for the application of paragraph (a); firstly, 
that the alleged company holds a ‘dominant position’ in the relevant market, and 
secondly, that it has exercised an ‘abuse’ of this dominant position.33 These conditions 
are thus essential requirements in order to raise a predatory pricing challenge and 
therefore warrant a closer analysis. 
 
2.1.1 Dominant position and market definitions 
Dominance is the fundamental requirement under Article 102 TFEU. It is only a 
‘dominant’ firm that can commit predatory pricing, since considerable strength is 
necessary to pull it off. The challenge is that determining whether a firm is ‘dominant’ 
is itself a difficult and uncertain exercise. What it means to hold a ‘dominant position’ 
will consequently be studied closer in this section. 
Various definitions of dominance have been offered, but the European Court of Justice 
(hereinafter referred to as the Court) has stated that a dominant position: 
‘… relates to a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which 
enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant 
market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent 
                                                          
33
 Article 102 TFEU first paragraph. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
9 
 
independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately of the 
customers’.34 
Although the definition captures the essence of what a dominant position is, it can, in 
some cases, be hard to determine whether or not a company actually holds a dominant 
position. Independence seems however to be a key factor; the greater the extent to 
which a company can act independently of its competitors, the greater its degree of 
dominance. The main indicator of this dominance is the company’s market share, since 
only a company which has won a large part of one market can be deemed to be in a 
dominant position.35 
According to the Court, a market share of 75 per cent or more leads to an irrebuttable 
presumption of dominance, and no further investigation is deemed necessary.36 
Moreover, a market share between 40 per cent and 55 per cent is enough to indicate a 
dominant position, as long as other factors are present.37 These factors can translate 
into different types of ‘market power’38 which can help in determining whether a 
company holds a dominant position or not. These factors are usually related to the 
properties of the relevant market and that of the other companies in the market.  
One such factor can be ‘barriers to entry’ or ‘entry barriers’.39 Although a vague term 
with no clear definition in relation to competition law,40 the existence of ‘entry barriers’ 
suggest that there are some circumstances which hinder new companies entering the 
market.41 Such hindering factors can for instance be economic, social, contractual 
                                                          
34
 Definition introduced in Case 27/26 United Brands v Commission, section 25, but repeated several 
times in later cases. 
35
 C Bellamy and G Child European Community Law of Competition (2001) at 201. 
36
 Case 85/76 Hoffman-La Roche v. Commission section 41, 53 to 56, 59 to 60, 67. 
37
 Case 27/26 United Brands v. Commission section  108 to 129, Supra n. 36 section 50 to 52 and 61 to 63, 
Case 62/86 AKZO v. Commission section 60. 
38
 ‘Having ‘market power’ implies that the company has the power to influence or alter a market by its 
actions. 
39
 OECD Policy Brief Competition and Barriers to Entry, third paragraph, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/37921908.pdf. See also section 1.3 third paragraph of this 
dissertation. 
40
 Ibid., third paragraph. 
41
 A Sullivan and S M Sheffrin Economics: Principles in action (2003) at 15. 
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commitments, lack of information etc.42 The higher the entry barriers, the more 
difficult it is for new actors to establish themselves in the market, and the stronger the 
market power of the alleged dominant company.43 
Another factor useful in determining dominant position is the market structure, i.e. the 
market share of the closest rivals.44 A significant gap between the market share of the 
presumed dominant company and the next largest competitor may confirm the 
existence of a dominant position.45 For instance, a company with a market share of 45 
per cent is highly unlikely to be held as a dominant one, if its closest competitor had a 
market share of 40 per cent. 
An example of a company found to hold a dominant position in a market despite having 
a relatively low market share, is found in Hoffman-La Roche.46 In this case, a market 
share of 47 per cent was enough to establish a dominant position in a market, when its 
biggest competitor had a market share of 27 per cent.47 In this particular case, 
however, an important factor was that, along with holding a greater market share, the 
company’s technology was considered superior to the one of its competitors. The judge 
stated that: 
‘An undertaking which has a very large market share and holds it for some time, 
by means of the volume of production and the scale of the supply which it 
stands for – without those having much smaller market shares being able to 
meet rapidly the demand from those who would like to break away from the 
undertaking which has the largest market share – is by virtue of that share in a 
position of strength which makes it an unavoidable trading partner and which, 
already because of this secures for it, at the very least during relatively long 
                                                          
42
 A Eberhard ‘European Competition Law: A critical Analysis of the Process Employed by the Commission 
to Assess Dominance under Article 82 EC’ (2006) Hanse Law Review at 225 to 226. 
43
 It can be mentioned that some commentators in recent years have argued that - although having 
theoretical interest – defining entry barriers is irrelevant to competition policy, ref. OECD Policy Brief 
Competition and Barriers to Entry, third paragraph, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/37921908.pdf. The Commission, however, still lists barriers to entry 
as an indicator of dominant position, see Commission Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market for 
the Purposes of Community Competition Law Official Journal of the European Communities C 372/5 
section 24. A further analysis of this issue falls outside the scope of this dissertation.     
44
 Supra n. 35 at 705. 
45
 Supra n. 42 at 225. 
46
 Case 85/76 Hoffman-LaRoche v Commission. 
47
 Ibid., section 41. 
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periods, that freedom of action which is the special feature of a dominant 
position’.48 
 
In other words, the Court found that although the defendant in this case did not have a 
very large market share, other factors indicated that it still had much power in the 
market, and was thus found to be in a dominant position. 
In general, it is acknowledged that the higher the market share, the less important are 
factors such as entry barriers and rival’s market share etc., and vice versa. In other 
words, determining dominance is a dynamic process. As this dissertation will later 
demonstrate,49 the requirement of proving abuse will be stricter when the dominant 
position is not very strong, and the converse is also true.50 
Additionally, it is a requirement that the undertaking in question holds a dominant 
position ‘within the common market’.51 ‘Market’ refers to both product/service market 
and to a geographic market.52 53 A relevant product market ‘comprises all those 
products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the 
consumer, by reason of the products’ characteristics, their prices and their intended 
use.’54 In other words, both the products physical characteristics and subjective 
elements may be of relevance.  
Relevant geographic market, on the other hand, encompasses the area wherein the 
undertakings in question engage in  ‘the supply and demand of products or services’ 
and further, where ‘the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogenous and 
which can be distinguished from neighboring areas because the conditions of 
competition are appreciably different in those areas.’55 A geographical market is not 
                                                          
48
 Ibid. 
49
 Section 2.1.2. 
50
 See section 2.1.2 and 2.2. 
51
 Article 102 TFEU first paragraph. 
52
 Commission Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the Purposes of Community 
Competition Law Official Journal of the European Communities C 372/5. 
53
 Market may also comprise ’Temporal Market’ which is the time dimension, but is rarely of practical 
relevance. For more information, supra n. 52 chapter II. 
54
 Supra n. 52 section 7. 
55
 Supra n. 52 section 8. 
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necessarily the entire Common Market, but might be reduced to a ‘substantial part’ 
thereof.56 
 In conclusion, a company must have a minimum market share of at least 40 per cent in 
the relevant product and geographical market, provided that its competitors are small 
and there are high barriers to enter the market. The criteria for determining dominance 
are however, vague, and rely to a great extent on how broadly or narrowly the relevant 
market is drawn. Consequently, dominant position is hard to predict and is decided on 
a case-to case basis. 
 
2.1.2 Abusive conduct – a general overview 
Holding a dominant position in a market is not, in itself, illegal. What is illegal, however, 
is when a company abuses its dominant position. The wording ‘any abuse’ in the first 
paragraph of Article 102 TFEU is a complex one and merits further clarification. The 
article lists several ways to abuse a dominant position, particularly the four categories 
in subsections (a), (b), (c) and (d). These cover abusive behavior such as discriminatory 
pricing, excessive pricing, refusal to deal, loyalty rebates, tying, requirements and 
exclusive dealing contracts as well as predatory pricing, which is covered by subsection 
(a). 
Abuse of a dominant position may however also consist of abusive conduct other than 
that listed above, note the wording ‘such abuse may, in particular, consist of’ in Article 
102 TFEU. The perhaps most extreme example of supposed abusive behavior, is when 
dominant companies have been found to be in breach of their so-called ‘special 
responsibility’ not to distort competition57, which will be elaborated on later on in this 
section.58 Beyond this, there is little open to interpretation in the wording of Article 102 
                                                          
56
 Supra n. 42 at 223, with referral to C Bellamy and G Child European Community Law of Competition 
(2001) at 702. 
57
 Mentioned for the first time in Case 322/81 Michelin v Commission, section 57. It is noteworthy that 
these forms of abuse were discussed under the dominance- requirement, but ever since it has been 
discussed under the abuse- requirement. Supra last paragraph of this section. 
58
 See last paragraph of this section 2.1.2. 
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TFEU. Some further guidance can be found in the EU case law, where a frequently used 
definition has held that: 
‘The concept of an abuse is an objective concept relating to the behavior of an 
undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the structure of 
a market where, as a result of the very presence of the undertaking in question, 
the degree of competition is weakened and which, through recourse to 
methods different from those which condition normal competition in products 
or services on the basis of transactions of commercial operators, has the effect 
of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the 
market or the growth of that competition’.59 
This is a very general definition which leads to many new questions. Three key 
elements for assessing abuse may however be identified: 
i) The assessment of abuse is an objective one; 
ii) The conduct in question must be differentiated from ‘normal competition’; 
and 
iii) The conduct must have the effect of hampering the growth of existing 
market-place competition, or indeed, even of inhibiting the preservation of 
the current level of competition.  
These elements that together constitute abusive behaviour are important ones when 
assessing an Art. 102 TFEU situation, and warrant closer analysis. 
First and foremost, an abuse in this context is an objective concept – intent is not a 
requirement.60 The EU court has furthermore explicitly stated that it is in the nature of 
the concept of abuse that a dominant company’s actions can be considered to be 
abusive even if intent is not evident.61 This principle must however be somewhat 
modified, as the EU court in some instances has accepted that intent is relevant.62 The 
AKZO test, a test developed by the Court in the case by the same name, can serve as an 
                                                          
59
 Definition introduced in Case 85/78 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, section 91, but repeated many 
times since, for instance in T-229-97 Irish Sugar v Commission, section 111 and T-219/99 British Airways v 
Commission, section 241. 
60
 Explicitly stated in C 6/72 Continental Can v Commission section 29. 
61
 T-65/89 BPB Industries Plc and British Gypsum Ltd v Commission, section 70. This is also mentioned in E 
Osterud Identifying Exclusionary Abuses by Dominant Undertakings under EU Competition Law (2010) at 
40. 
62
 See for instance the assessment of abuse in Case 62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission.  
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example.63  In this case concerning predatory pricing, it was held that if a price is higher 
than the variable costs, but lower than the total costs,64 intent has to be proven to 
establish attempt of predatory pricing.65 This is in contrast to a situation where the 
prices are below average variable costs, because there is no conceivable economic 
purpose for such prices other than the elimination of a competitor, since each item 
produced and sold entails a loss for the undertaking. Consequently, the courts 
distinguish between different situations, and accept that sometimes the objective test 
is appropriate and at other times intent is required. 
The second key element of the above mentioned definition is that abuse implies the 
use of ‘methods different from those which condition normal competition in products 
or services on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators’. In other words, a 
line is drawn between ‘normal competition’, which is always considered legal, and 
‘abnormal competition’, which is considered abusive, if it has an anticompetitive 
effect.66 The question thus becomes what is considered ‘normal competition’. 
The Court has not provided any definition of ‘normal competition’, or any guidance on 
how to interpret this. What seems clear however is that the terminology allows the 
dominant undertaking a certain leeway to take measures in response to competition in 
the market.67 Furthermore, it is sensible to interpret that competitive behavior that is 
common in a particular market must be considered legal. As will be demonstrated later 
                                                          
63
 Case 62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission. 
64
 The AKZO test is a test developed by the Court in Case 62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission.  
64
 Case 62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission. For a detailed description of the AKZO test and the 
meaning of average variable costs and average total costs, see the case analysis in section 2.2.1. of this 
dissertation. 
65
 Ibid., section 72. 
66
 E Osterud Identifying Exclusionary Abuses by Dominant Undertakings under EU Competition Law 
(2010) at 40. 
67
O Kolstad Norsk Konkurranserett Bind I Atferdsregler og strukturkontroll (2007) at 366. This starting 
point may however be modified in light of France Telecome v Commission (previously Wanadoo) where it 
was held that France Telecom was not allowed to meet its competitor’s competition by implementing 
the same measures as its competitor. The reason behind this was the doctrine of the dominant 
company’s special responsibility, and it was held that ‘undertakings in a dominant position may be 
deprived of the right to adopt a course of conduct or take measures which are not in themselves abuses 
and which would even be unobjectionable if adopted or taken by non-dominant undertakings‘see 
section 186. 
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on in this dissertation this is however not necessarily the case, since cases regarding 
the special responsibility doctrine have concluded that abusive misconduct can exist 
even where common, normally accepted behavior has been exercised.68 It has been 
claimed that the term ‘normal competition’ in Hoffmann- La Roche is the result of a bad 
translation in the English version of the case.69 Whatever the reason, the Court has 
modified the definition of abuse somewhat in Michelin I, where it is stated that ‘normal 
competition’ means ‘… normal competition in products and services based on traders’ 
performance ….’70 Based on this statement, normal competition based on the trader’s 
performance cannot be seen as abusive according to Article 102 TFEU. 
How this rule has been practiced by the Court has varied, but has often been referred 
to as ‘competition on the merits’.71 This means that dominant companies are free to 
compete with, and to outperform, their competitors as long as they are competing on 
the merits. This standpoint however, requires clarification as it has recently been 
stated that a dominant company can only compete on the merits as long as it is not in 
breach of its special responsibility not to distort competition.72 
The third element regarding the traditional definition of abuse, concerns the precise 
meaning behind the phrase ‘… the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of 
competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition’. Since a 
negative effect for the consumers is not listed as a requirement for determining abuse, 
a natural interpretation is that the behavior must have an effect on competition to be 
considered abusive. In other words, it is the residual competition in the market that is 
decisive of what constitutes abuse. In a highly concentrated market with limited 
competition, even minor measures taken by the dominant company can have 
                                                          
68
 This was found to be the case in for instance C-395/96P and C-396/96 Compagnie maritime belge 
transports v Commission. 
69
 Supra n. 66 at 41, and J Kallagher & B Sher ‘Rebates revisited: Anti-competitive Effects and 
Exclusionary Abuse under Article 82’ (2004) European Competition Law Review 25, no. 5 at 270. 
70
 C-322/81 Michelin v Commission section 70. 
71
 For instance in T-228/97 Irish Sugar v Commission section 11, T-65/98 Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v 
Commission section 157, T-203/01 Michelin v. Commission section 97 and T-201/04 Microsoft v 
Commission section 1070. 
72
 Mentioned in T-65/98 Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v. Commission section158 to 159. 
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considerable consequences for the competitiveness in the market. The potential of a 
dominant undertaking to cause significant damage, increases with the market share. 
Hence, the bigger the market share, the more stringent the assessment of abuse. A 
dominant undertaking with a market share of 90 per cent will thus be subject to a 
stricter assessment standard than a dominant undertaking with a market share of, for 
instance, 50 per cent.73 
One area where this ‘effect on competition’ element of the abuse definition is 
particularly evident is in the cases regarding the dominant companies’ ‘special 
responsibility’ not to distort competition.74 The doctrine of ‘special responsibility’ 
relates to the effect that dominant undertakings’ actions have on the residual 
competition in the market. The Court has decided that the damaging effect dominant 
companies’ might have on competition can cause them to be in violation of Art. 102 
TFEU.75 
There are no pre-defined criteria for when a dominant company is in breach of its 
special responsibility not to distort competition. Rather, the Court has held that this 
needs to be decided on a case-to case basis, where specific circumstances can show 
that the competition has been weakened.76 Indeed, the Court has stated that 
competitive measures which may not normally be regarded as abusive and may even 
be seen as desirable in some circumstances, could nevertheless be found to be in 
breach of Art. 102 TFEU if it has an anti-competitive effect on the market.77 This strict 
approach has led to a considerable amount of criticism by scholars.78 
                                                          
73
 Examples can be found in T-65/98 Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v. Commission section 157 and T-201/04 
Microsoft v. Commission section 1070. 
74
 Introduced for the first time in C 322/81 Michelin v Commission section 57. It is noteworthy that the 
special responsibility-doctrine was discussed under the dominance-requirement in this case, but has ever 
since been debated under the assessment of abuse. 
75
 C 322/81 Michelin v Commission section 57. 
76
 C-395/96 and C-396/96 P Campagnie belge transports v Commission section 149. 
77
 T-340/03 France Télécom v Commission section 186. 
78
 See for instance B Sher ‘The Last of Steam-Powered Trains: Modernising Article 82 (2004) European 
Competition Law Review 243, and Rafael Allendesalazar ‘Can We Finally Say Farewell to the “Special 
Responsibility” of Dominant Companies?’ European Competition Law Annual 2007. 
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To sum up, it can be argued that the traditional definition of abuse used by the EU 
courts is very general. This can be convenient since it offers more leeway in 
determining abuse on a case by case basis. On the other hand, it can be argued that the 
definition is too general, to the extent that it may be very hard to distinguish between 
legal and illegal behavior.79 Based on vague, undefined parameters such as 
‘performance- based competition’ and ‘competition on the merits’, and ill-defined 
requirements for abuse, the definition offers poor guidance when a company wishes to 
assess the legality or otherwise of various competitive measures. 
In order to further clarify what is considered abusive misconduct, both in general and 
with regard to predatory pricing in particular, the case law provides some insight. In the 
next section the dissertation will focus on EU cases regarding predatory pricing, with an 
aim to establishing a clearer rule for illegal predatory pricing. 
 
2.2. EU Predatory Pricing case law 
This section takes a closer look at the EU case law related to illegal predatory pricing in 
breach of Article 102 (a) TFEU. The goal is to establish how the rule is enforced in 
practice, and to define some key factors in cases regarding predatory pricing. 
 
2.2.1. AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission 
2.2.1.1. Background and outcome of the AKZO case 
One of the key decisions regarding predatory pricing in EU competition law is the AKZO 
case from 1991.80 AKZO, a large, Dutch multinational firm, manufactured organic 
peroxides and had a market share of more than 60 per cent. ECS (Engineering and 
Chemical Suppliers Ltd.), on the other hand, was a small UK based company engaged in 
the flour segment of the market, producing benozyle peroxide. ECS’ market share had 
                                                          
79
 Supra n. 66 at 46. 
80
 C- 62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission. 
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been stable for around a decade, until 1979 when it gained capacity and decided to 
expand its business to plastic makers, some of whom were originally AKZO’s customers. 
Aggravated by this development, AKZO officials told ECS’ manager that AKZO would 
take ‘aggressive measures’ in the ECS dominated milling products sector if ECS did not 
cease to supply its products to the plastics industry.81 According to the ECS’ manager, 
AKZO officials threatened to cut prices drastically below established prices to drive ECS 
out of the flour market. 82 When ECS decided not to respond to AKZO’s inquiry, AKZO 
followed through with their threats. 
During the course of the next four years, AKZO targeted ECS’ customers and sold them 
the same products at a significantly reduced price. At the same time, AKZO charged 
their own loyal customers 60 per cent more than the customers targeted by ECS. As a 
result of this, ECS’ profit margins fell and their turnover decreased by 70 per cent. ECS 
filed a complaint to the Commission, alleging that AKZO was engaging in predatory 
pricing. The Commission found AKZO guilty, and imposed a fine of ten million ECU on 
AKZO.83  
In accordance with Article 102 TFEU, the court first assessed whether AKZO held a 
dominant position in the relevant market. The court found that their dominance was 
beyond doubt in this case and all AKZO’s arguments to the contrary were rejected.84 
Next, the court addressed the question of whether AKZO had abused this dominant 
position. The court found that prices below average variable costs – in other words 
costs which vary depending on the quantities produced, by means of which a dominant 
undertaking seeks to eliminate a competitor, must be regarded as abusive.85 
Considering the fact that selling at prices below average variable costs generated a loss 
for every sale, the court stated that there are no other rational explanations for a 
                                                          
81
 Ibid. section 81. 
82
 Ibid. section 79. 
83
 Ibid. section 9 to 10. 
84
 Ibid. section 55 to 62. 
85
 Ibid. section 71. 
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dominant actor to reduce prices to this level other than in an attempt to force 
competitors out of the market. 
Moreover, the court found that prices above the company’s average variable costs, but 
below its average total costs,86 must be regarded as abusive if they are implemented as 
a part of a scheme to force a competitor out of the market.87 The court’s reasoning is 
that such prices can force out undertakings which may be as efficient as the dominant 
undertaking, but which, as a result of their smaller financial resources, are incapable of 
withstanding the competition waged against them.88 
Furthermore, the court noted the seriousness of AKZO’s transgression insofar as the 
conduct complained of was intended to preclude a competitor from extending its 
activity into a market in which AKZO held a dominant position.89 In other words, the 
court found that the predatory intent by AKZO was a key factor in determining the 
outcome of the case. Thus, the complaint from ECS was found to be substantiated, and 
AKZO was found guilty of abuse of dominant position in the form of predatory pricing 
under Article 102 TFEU. The fine was however reduced by 25 per cent to 7.5 million 
ECU.90 
 
2.2.1.2. Conclusions from the AKZO case 
Based on the court’s findings, the AKZO case has established the following guidelines 
for determining predatory pricing: 
(i) If the price is lower than the average variable costs, it is a strong indication 
of predatory pricing, and further investigation is deemed unnecessary; 
(ii) If the prices are higher than the average variable costs but lower than the 
average total costs, it must be proven that the dominant undertaking’s 
                                                          
86
 A company’s total costs refer to its fixed costs plus its variable costs. 
87
 Supra n. 80 section 71. 
88
 Ibid. section 72. 
89
 Ibid. section 162. 
90
 Ibid. section 164. 
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purpose or intent behind the pricing scheme is a desire to force the 
competitor out of the market to establish predatory pricing; 
(iii) Prices above average total costs will normally not be considered predatory. 
An interesting question then becomes what is meant by ‘eliminatory intent’. According 
to the court, having eliminatory intent means that the actions were ‘part of a plan for 
eliminating a competitor.’91 This statement suggests that the alleged predator must 
have had dishonourable objectives, and that its actions were motivated by an overall 
goal of inflicting harm on its competitors. This was found to be the case in AKZO, where 
the court found that the intention behind the strategy adopted by AKZO was to 
damage its competitor ECS, and not to pursue a general policy of favorable prices.92 
The selective use of prices below average total costs but above average variable costs 
proved that AKZO intentionally targeted a specific competitor.93 
The test made by the court in the AKZO case, is easy enough to understand and a 
seemingly easy way of identifying whether the company in question has abused its 
dominant position by way of predatory pricing. It has, however, been argued that the 
AKZO test may not be a very clear cut one in all cases or industries, and that it may 
have limited value as a one-size-fits-all model for assessing predatory pricing. For 
instance, it has been contended that the AKZO test would not reflect the economic 
reality in some industries.94 As an example, it could be difficult to apply the test to 
industries where common costs are a significant part of the total costs. These are costs 
which cannot be assigned to the single product or service, and as a result one cannot 
define one product’s average cost, leaving the model from AKZO an unpractical one.  
Moreover, the requirement of intent necessary to establish predatory pricing in cases 
where the prices used by the alleged predator are below average total costs, is difficult 
                                                          
91
 Ibid. section 72.  
92
 Ibid. section 115. 
93
 Ibid. section 113 to 115. 
94
 P Lowe ’EU Competition Practice on Predatory Pricing’ (5 December 2003) Introductory address to the 
Seminar “Pros and Cons of Low Prices” at 4 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2003_066_en.pdf.  
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to reconcile with the judicial precedent stating that the concept of ‘abuse’ is an 
objective one.95 
Although the AKZO test has some critics, it has also been applied in other cases of 
importance in relation to predatory pricing, such as the Tetra Pak case.96   
 
2.2.2. Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission 
2.2.2.1. Background of the Tetra Pak case 
Tetra Pak is a company originating from Switzerland, which produces packaging 
machines and packaging for liquids, primarily milk. The company had a dominant 
position in the relevant market, with an overall market share of 78 per cent in the 
relevant sectors.97 This was a share seven times bigger than its largest competitor. 
Tetra Pak was accused of tying98 and predatory pricing in the Italian market. Only the 
latter will be examined here. 
The Commission argued that Tetra Pak sold Tetra Rex cartons in Italy at a very low price 
in an attempt to drive out its competitors. According to the Commission, the extremely 
negative gross margins suffered by Tetra Pak between 1976 and 1986, together with 
the price differences between cartons sold in Italy and other countries of Community, 
left a presumption of eliminatory intent.99 
The applicant, on the other hand, argued that the prices it charged in Italy between 
1976 and 1982 were not predatory, but a result of a fierce commercial competition 
between Tetra Pak and Elopak.100 The applicant furthermore argued that there was no 
predatory intent behind the fact that they reduced their prices below its average 
variable costs, thus the reasoning of the Court in AKZO v Commission would be 
                                                          
95
 Ibid., at 3. 
96
 C-333/94 Tetra Pak International SA v Commission. 
97
 More specifically the aseptic and non-aseptic sectors. 
98
 Tying is when a company is making a customer buy one thing in order to get another. 
99
 Supra n. 96 section 146. 
100
 Ibid. section 142. 
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inapplicable.101 Moreover, Tetra Pak argued that it was not realistic that they would be 
able to recoup their losses after the alleged predatory pricing.102 
Consequently it was argued that (i) it was up to the Commission to prove an 
eliminatory intent, and; (ii) on the basis of the recent judgment of the Supreme Court 
of the United States, Brooke Group v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco,103 sales at a loss 
can only be considered eliminatory where the company in question has a reasonable 
prospect of eventually recouping its incurred losses.104  
In its verdict, the court began by repeating the stand taken in United Brands v. 
Commission, namely that a company in a dominant position may take reasonable steps 
to protect its position, but that this right does not include a right to strengthen and 
abuse its dominant position.105 Furthermore, the Court found, in accordance with the 
stance taken in AKZO v. Commission, that: 
 ‘an undertaking in a dominant position has no interest in applying prices below 
average variable costs (that is to say, those which vary depending on the 
quantities produced) except that of eliminating competitors so as to enable it 
subsequently to raise its prices by taking advantage of its monopolistic position, 
since each sale generates a loss equal to the total amount of the fixed costs 
(that is to say, those which remain constant regardless of the quantities 
produced) and at least part of the variable costs relating to the unit 
produced.’106  
 
 It was thus unnecessary to discuss whether Tetra Pak had shown eliminatory intent 
since the compa y, in the years between 1976 and 1981, had reduced prices 
considerably below average variable costs in the relevant market. According to the 
                                                          
101
 Ibid. section 143 referring to C- 62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission section 71. 
102
 ‘Recoupment’ is when the predator regains the money lost during an often long-lasting predatory 
pricing scheme. The hope of recoupment is considered to be the pivotal reason for any company 
attempting a predatory pricing scheme. 
103
 Brooke Group v Brown & Williamson Tobacco 509 U.S. 209 (1993). For analysis of the case see section 
3.3.3. of this dissertation. 
104
 Supra n. 96 section 143. 
105
 Ibid. section 147. 
106
 Ibid. section 148 with referrals to C- 62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission section 72, 140 and 146. 
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court, there was no other rational explanation for selling products at prices this low 
unless it is to drive a competitor out of the market.107 
Regarding Tetra Pak’s second key argument, namely that the possibility of recoupment 
had to be proven, the Court found that it was not necessary to show explicitly that 
Tetra Pak had a reasonable prospect of recouping its losses.108 Instead, the court 
stressed the fact that ‘it must be possible to penalize predatory pricing whenever there 
is a risk that competitors will be eliminated.’109 Such risk was found to be present in the 
case, and Tetra Pak was accordingly found guilty of predatory pricing in the years 1976 
to 1982.110 
 
2.2.2.2. Conclusions from the Tetra Pak case 
From a predatory pricing point of view, there are two important things to take from the 
Tetra Pak case. Firstly, the Tetra Pak case strengthened the stance taken by the Court in 
the AKZO case, namely that prices below average variable costs will always be 
considered predatory, and that prices below average total costs are predatory if there 
is proof of eliminatory intent. This contributed to a stronger precedence that the test is 
an applicable one when assess ng predatory pricing in the EU. 
Secondly, a new development in the Tetra Pak case was that the court stated explicitly 
that it was unnecessary to demonstrate the possibility of recoupment.111 The stance 
taken in Tetra Pak concerning recoupment does not necessarily mean that the 
possibility of recoupment cannot be an important factor in a predatory pricing scheme, 
for instance when assessing the existence of eliminatory intent. Nevertheless, it is in 
conflict with the view of many economists, who firmly believe that the possibility of 
recoupment is the very essence and purpose of predatory pricing, and subsequently 
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 Ibid. section 148 to 150. 
108
 Ibid. section 150.  
109
 Ibid., section 44. 
110
 Ibid. section 152. 
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 Ibid. section 150.  
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that this aspect should be given considerably more weight in the assessment of alleged 
predatory pricing.112    
Moreover, this is in strong contrast to the findings in the US case Brooke Group from 
1993,113 where the likelihood of recoupment had to be proven in order to be found 
guilty of predatory pricing.114 By taking this stance, the court explicitly disassociates 
from the way that predatory pricing was practiced in the US. The Brook Group case will 
be subject to a closer examination later in this dissertation,115 and a closer analysis of 
the approach taken by the EU will be revisited in chapter 4. 
 
2.3. Conclusions  
In conclusion, the EU has not developed, through regulations nor case law, any one-
size-fits-all model for determining predatory pricing. On the contrary, establishing 
predatory pricing is found to be a dynamic process where the onus of proof varies 
depending on the market structure and the power of the company in question. The 
reasons for this are many, but a key reason is likely to be that it is extremely difficult to 
create a test which has the ability to take into consideration all the economic and 
structural factors that is necessary to determine whether predatory pricing is or has 
taken place. The advantage of this is that it gives the courts more flexibility in 
determining whether predatory pricing has taken place or not. A challenge, on the 
other hand, is that it limits the predictability for the companies, and can make it 
difficult for them to assess what competitive measures will be regarded as abusive.  
Some guidelines are, however, provided by the case law. To be found guilty of 
predatory pricing in the EU, the company in question needs to hold a dominant 
position in the relevant market, and abuse this position by either pricing below average 
variable costs, or below average total costs as long as eliminatory intent is evident. 
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 For more about this, see chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
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 Supra n. 103. 
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In the next chapter, the focus will be on the regulation and practice of predatory 
pricing in the US. 
 
3. PREDATORY PRICING IN THE US 
3.1. The Sherman Act 
This section will focus on the ban on predatory pricing in US competition law (‘antitrust 
law’). The legal background for the prohibition of predatory pricing in the US is found in 
the Sherman Act,116 the Federal Trade Commission Act,117 and the Clayton Act as 
amended by the Robinson Patman Act.118 The most commonly used regarding 
predatory pricing is section 2 of the Sherman Act, which will thus be the focus of this 
dissertation. The provision reads in its entirety: 
‘Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade 
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine 
not exceeding $ 100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person,  
$ 1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said 
punishments, in the discretion of the court’.119 
 
This section 2 of the Sherman Act makes illegal monopolization, or attempts thereof. 
The implications for being in breach of this prohibition may be severe for the company 
in question; in the range of multimillion dollar fines. The fundamental purpose of the 
provision is to protect a market-based economy that increases economic growth – or in 
the words of the Supreme Court: 
‘The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic 
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. 
It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces 
will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest price, the 
highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time 
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 The Sherman Act of 1890 15 U.S.C. section 2. 
117
 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits unfair or deceptive trade practices. 
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 The Robinson Patman Act  15 USC § 13(a) section 3. 
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providing an environment conductive to the preservation of our democratic 
political and social institutions.’120 
 
The formulation above identifies the essence of the US antitrust goals, namely to 
protect the process of free competition. At the same time it acknowledges the larger 
political and social aspects that are served by protecting the competition process. 
To ensure this goal of protecting the competition process, it has been regarded as 
necessary to prohibit certain types of behavior, such as unlawful monopolization as set 
out in the Section 2 of the Act. In short, this provision prohibits: 
(i) Willful monopolization; 
(ii) Attempted monopolization; 
(iii) Combination or conspiracy to monopolize.121 
‘Monopolization’ seems to be a key term in relation to section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
‘Monopolization’ can be construed to mean an attempt to attain monopoly power. 
What it means to have ‘monopoly power’ is however not defined in the act, but can be 
construed to mean that the company in question holds a monopoly-like situation, 
where it has power to the extent that it can behave independently of its competitors, if 
any, and that it can dictate the prices in a market.  
Having monopoly power is however not illegal according to the act. What is illegal is to 
obtain or maintain monopoly power unlawfully. It has been held that unlawful 
monopolization requires two key elements, the first being monopoly power, and the 
second the ‘willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from 
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or 
historic accident.’122 Concerning the first aspect, it is natural that the monopolization 
refers to the company in question having monopoly power in the relevant market;123 
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however it is a requirement that this monopoly power is only unlawful if acquired by 
anticompetitive conduct.124 Such anticompetitive conduct is usually described as 
‘exclusionary’ or ‘predatory’ conduct, and may include conduct to obtain a monopoly 
unlawfully, and to maintain it unlawfully.125 
In other words, at its core, this section renders it illegal to obtain or maintain monopoly 
power through improper means.126 ‘Improper means’ seems to be a key element in this 
regard, as attaining a monopoly through fair and legal competitive measures will not be 
deemed illegal. Achieving monopoly through predatory pricing is one such improper 
means. A line must, in other words, be drawn between ‘natural’ monopolization, where 
competitors have acquired a monopoly because they have a superior product, are 
more efficient or have lower prices, and ‘unlawful’ monopolization acquired through 
improper means, such as predatory pricing, cartels etc. 
Secondly, section 2 of the Sherman Act also prohibits any ‘attempt to monopolize’, 
which includes a prohibition against attempted predatory pricing. Predatory pricing is 
thus illegal in the US because of the fear that it will create a monopoly for the company 
undertaking such pricing schemes. It must then be ascertained further what the 
requirements are to establish this ‘attempt to monopolize’. 
According to the case law, establishing attempted monopolization requires proof ‘(1) 
that the respondent has embarked on a predatory pricing scheme or committed to 
other ‘anticompetitive conduct’ with (2) a ‘specific intent’ to monopolize and (3) has a 
‘dangerous probability’ of attaining monopoly power.127  
The term ‘anticompetitive conduct’ is vague, and the wording offers little or no 
guidance as to what kind of behaviour qualifies as anticompetitive. It has, however, 
been defined as ‘business or government practices that prevent or reduce competition 
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in a market.’128 In other words, anticompetitive conduct includes behaviour which has 
an anticompetitive or restraining effect on the competition in the market in question. 
Such practices or behaviour traditionally include predatory pricing, dumping, exclusive 
dealing, refusal to deal, tying etc. 
The next question is what is meant by a ‘specific intent to monopolize’. According to 
case law, this entails a specific intention of destroying competition or to create a 
monopoly.129 This suggests that the anticompetitive practice undertaken by the 
company in question must be carried out for the purpose of driving out its competitors 
and establishing a monopoly situation. The anticompetitive behavior is, in other words, 
not illegal if the objective is to compete strongly without the intent to monopolize. 
Thirdly, the anticompetitive behaviour with intent to monop lize is only unlawful if 
there is a ‘dangerous probability’ of actually achieving monopoly power. This 
‘dangerous probability’ requirement includes consideration of the relevant market, and 
the alleged predator’s capacity to diminish or destroy the competition in that 
market.130 In other words, it must be likely that the company attempting to gain 
monopoly by eliminating competition actually has the ability to do so. In order to gauge 
whether a company has such ability, it may be necessary to carry out a market 
structure analysis. It is likely that only a dominant company would have the necessary 
strength to create a monopoly with the probable outcome of eliminating competition. 
The reasoning behind this approach is to prevent any constraint of the ‘vigorous and 
creative unilateral-business strategies’131 of smaller companies, which may arise ‘out of 
fear of section 2 liability.’132 
The seemingly strict requirements for liability under Section 2 of the Sherman Act are 
due to the fact that the legislators appreciated the fine line between competition-
hampering monopolization and desirable, aggressive competition-promoting behavior. 
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Scholars have recognized that aggressive competitive conduct, even from dominant 
companies, has a favorable effect on the consumers, as well as the fact that aggressive 
exclusionary conduct is harmful to consumers. The problem, and a great challenge for 
the courts, is that competitive and exclusionary conduct often looks the same.133  
The threshold of being convicted of attempt to monopolize in accordance with Section 
2 of the Sherman Act is, in other words, high. In order to ascertain how this regulation 
works with regard to predatory pricing in practice, it is useful to look at some cases 
settled by the courts. This will thus be the topic of discussion in the next section of this 
dissertation. 
 
3.2. US Case Law 
Predatory pricing is, in a way, a conundrum since a company is, in essence, accused of 
charging prices that are too low.134 Price cutting is a competitive strategy that is 
beneficial to consumers and only harmful if an undertaking succeeds with a predatory 
pricing scheme and subsequently raises its prices. A failed predatory pricing attempt, 
on the other hand, is considered advantageous for consumers. To erroneously find an 
undertaking guilty of predatory pricing would be a disservice to competition and 
ultimately to the consumers, and would consequently undermine the very purpose of 
what Section 2 of the Sherman Act is designed to protect.  A key question is therefore 
how to create a clear rule under section 2 of the Sherman Act that prohibits illegal 
predatory pricing whilst at the same time provides clear guidance to companies, 
competition authorities and courts.135 
To find such guidelines and establish how section 2 of the Sherman Act, and specifically 
predatory pricing, is implemented in practice, one needs to study the case law.  
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Regarding US cases concerning predatory pricing, it has been said that the plaintiff has 
won litigated cases far too often, including cases they should have lost.136 Along with 
those reasons cited earlier in this dissertation, this is one of the key issues for which the 
ban on predatory pricing attracts significant criticism.137 An example is the decision in 
Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.138  
 
3.2.1. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Banking Co. 
Utah Pie was a small, family run company producing fresh pies located in Salt Lake City. 
In 1957, it decided to expand its business to include the frozen pie market. In the 
frozen pie market, Utah Pie had to compete with three large nationwide companies, 
and was able to undercut its national competitors’ prices since they produced their pies 
locally.  In response, the competitors also lowered their prices. One competitor, 
Continental Baking Company, started selling its frozen pies in the Salt Lake City market 
for $2.85, which was below-cost price, while charging higher prices for the same pies in 
other locations. In turn, Utah Pie reduced its price for frozen apple pies to $2.75, a 
price Continental Baking Company refused to match. In 1961, Utah Pie filed suit for 
price discrimination. 
The original ruling was in favor of Utah Pie, before the Court of Appeal reversed the 
decision. The Supreme Court ruled, however, in favor of the plaintiff, finding that 
Continental Baki g Company had engaged in predatory pricing due to the fact that a 
jury may have ‘reasonably concluded that a competitor who is forced to reduce his 
price to a new all-time low in a market of declining prices will in time feel the financial 
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pinch and will be a less effective competitive force.’139 This conclusion was reached 
even though Utah Pie’s sales volume steadily increased, and its financial position 
improved in 1958-1961, because its share in the Salt Lake City market had decreased 
slightly. 
The ruling in Utah Pie received a great deal of criticism, and was claimed to be an 
example of a case where the courts protected competitors rather than competition.140 
The decision has been called the most anticompetitive decision of the decade,141 and it 
has been said that the alleged predators were found guilty not of injuring competition 
but simply of competing.142 A common criticism was also that the feasibility of 
recoupment was not weighted in the ruling. Despite the criticism, the case was not a 
deviation from the norm at the time as there were several cases with similar 
outcome.143 
 
3.2.2. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp 
Another important case regarding predatory pricing is the Matsushita case.144 The 
background for this case was that Matsushita, a Japanese manufacturer of electric 
equipment, were allegedly conspiring to destroy the American television industry. This 
was purportedly done by (i) charging very high prices in Japan and (ii) using the 
monopoly profits from the Japanese market to subsidize the predatory prices on export 
sales to the US market, in an attempt to eliminate its American competitors and 
establishing a monopoly. 
According to the plaintiff Zenith, the predatory pricing had been ongoing for two 
decades, and while producers like themselves would suffer economic losses in the 
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short run, American consumers would suffer in the long run, after monopoly had been 
established by their Japanese competitors. 
In its ruling, the Supreme Court found that for a predatory pricing scheme to be 
successful, the predator must be likely to acquire a monopoly position. Secondly, the 
predatory pricing must cause entry barriers for potential new competitors, and thirdly 
the predator must be able to uphold its monopoly position for long enough to recoup 
its losses and eventually make profits as a result of the predatory pricing.145  
In this case, the Supreme Court found that the conditions for predatory pricing were 
not fulfilled, since the alleged predatory pricing had not caused any entry barriers for 
new competitors. 
From the Matsushita case one can conclude that at least three conditions must be in 
place to be convicted of predatory pricing, namely: 
(i) The likelihood of attaining monopoly; 
(ii) Entry barriers for new competitors must be created from the predatory 
pricing strategy; 
(iii) The alleged predator must be able to uphold the monopoly for a 
considerable period of time, at least long enough to recoup its losses and 
profit by the strategy. 
 
3.2.3. Brooke Group Ltd v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp 
Although the Matsushita case had provided some useful guidelines regarding the 
practice of the ban on predatory pricing, a more definite breakthrough after decades of 
uncertainties was the 1993 case of Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson.146 The case is 
regarded as a very important one. By way of background, the petitioner, Liggett, 
entered the cigarette market in 1980 with a line of generic cigarettes at a price 30 per 
cent lower than branded cigarettes. Within the next four years, Liggett managed to 
gain 4 per cent of the overall cigarette market at the expense of the well established 
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companies selling branded cigarettes. Aggravated by the new development, the 
respondent Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp decided to introduce their own brand of 
low priced generic cigarettes, beating Liggett’s net price. Liggett responded, resulting in 
a price war. According to Liggett, Brown & Williamson sold their generic cigarettes with 
a loss. Liggett subsequently alleged that Brown & Williamson were engaging in 
unlawful predatory pricing.147 
The complaint from Liggett was that the prices introduced by Brown & Williamson 
were below-cost in an attempt to force Liggett to raise its prices on generic cigarettes. 
This in turn allegedly restrained the economic growth in the generic cigarette market, 
and as a consequence preserved Brown & Williamson’s supra-competitive profit 
margin on the branded cigarettes.148 
In its ruling, the Supreme Court found that in order to prove predatory pricing, the 
plaintiff first and foremost needs to demonstrate that the prices complained of are 
below an appropriate measure of its rival’s costs in the short term.149 Secondly, the 
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff needs to prove that the company accused of 
predatory pricing, in accordance with the Sherman Act section 2, had a ‘dangerous 
probability’ of recouping its losses from its low pricing later on.150 The Supreme Court 
stated further that the plaintiff in such cases had to demonstrate that there was a 
likelihood that the alleged predatory pricing scheme undertaken by the defendant 
would later cause an increase in prices to an above competitive level, and that it would 
eventually make up for the money and resources the alleged predator had invested in 
it.151  
It is thus evident from the Brooke case that recoupment is a key feature of predatory 
pricing, and that it is up to the plaintiff to prove the likely occurrence of such 
recoupment. 
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Additionally, the Supreme Court also explains that evidence of below-cost prices is, in 
itself, not sufficient to serve as proof of probable recoupment. 152 In order to determine 
whether there is a realistic possibility of recoupment, one has to estimate the cost of 
the alleged predation and do a close analysis of both the scheme alleged by the 
plaintiff and the structure and conditions of the relevant market.153 In this particular 
case, Liggett had not done enough to prove such realistic possibility of recoupment, 
and the claim was consequently rejected.  
From the Brooke case one can conclude that to prevail in a predatory pricing claim, the 
plaintiff must prove two things: firstly, that the prices were below an appropriate 
measure of defendant’s costs in the short term and secondly, that the defendant had a 
dangerous probability of recoupment in the long run.154  
 
3.3. Conclusions 
 In conclusion, the US case law regarding predatory pricing underlines the importance 
of the possibility of recoupment. Recoupment seems to be considered the very essence 
of a predatory pricing strategy, for without it competition will not suffer. Consequently, 
unlike in the EU, it is not sufficient to prove that the company alleged to have engaged 
in predatory pricing has sold its products or services below average variable costs. The 
difference between the US approach and the EU approach will be the subject of the 
next section of this dissertation. 
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4. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE EU AND THE US APPROACH TO PREDATORY PRICING 
4.1. Key differences 
As demonstrated in the previous two chapters of this dissertation, there are indeed 
some noteworthy differences regarding the ban on predatory pricing in the EU and the 
US. The ban against predatory pricing in Article 102 TFEU in the EU requires that a 
company holds a dominant position in the market as a prerequisite to a finding of guilt 
with regard to predatory pricing.155 A company with a low market share is thus allowed 
to take competitive measures, or compete more aggressively, than its dominant 
counterparts.  
Such prerequisite is not explicitly stated in section 2 of the Sherman Act. In practice, 
however, predatory pricing is likely to be a realistic strategy only for dominant 
companies also in the US, as the smaller companies are very unlikely to have pockets 
deep enough to execute it. The focal point in the Sherman Act is to avoid 
monopolization through anticompetitive conduct. A predatory pricing claim in 
accordance with Section 2 of the Sherman Act thus requires ‘a dangerous probability of 
achieving monopoly power.’156 A company that does not hold a dominant position in 
the relevant market will never be likely of attaining a monopoly, and will consequently 
not be found guilty of predatory pricing. It has been said that behavior which is 
normally compliant with antitrust law may be considered exclusionary when exercised 
by a monopolist.157 Implicitly, dominance is therefore also a prerequisite for predatory 
pricing in the US. 
Furthermore, to establish predatory pricing in the EU, it is sufficient that the prices 
applied are below average variable costs.158 This has been explicitly stated in cases like 
AKZO and Tetra Pak, with the logic that it makes no sense for a dominant company to 
sell its goods or services for prices this low if not in an attempt to eliminate 
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competition. The US antitrust law, on the other hand, has no such set guidelines.159 On 
the contrary, the US courts have found that below-cost pricing in itself was not 
sufficient to establish predatory pricing, without also proving a realistic possibility of 
recoupment.160 
In the EU, prices below average variable costs are presumed to be a result of predatory 
intent, and no further proof is necessary. Proof of intent in the EU first becomes a 
requirement when prices are higher than the average variable costs but lower than the 
average total costs.161 In the US, on the other hand, ‘specific intent to monopolize’ 
seems to always be a requirement.162 ‘Specific intent to monopolize’ is said to mean ‘a 
specific intent to destroy competition or build a monopoly.’163 Merely to compete 
vigorously to beat a rival’s prices is, in other words, not sufficient to prove such intent.  
As mentioned, dominant firms have however been found guilty of abusive conduct in 
accordance with Article 102 TFEU in cases where no such intent has been found, based 
on the rationale that dominant companies have a special responsibility not to distort 
competition.164 In the EU, this burden of proof gets stricter the bigger the market share 
is, and in some cases the burden of proof seems not to be necessary at all. In the US, 
however, the proof of intent is always a requirement. This dissertation argues that 
proof of intent is a stricter condition, and that predatory pricing is consequently harder 
to prove in the US.  
The most significant difference between predatory pricing in the EU and the US relates 
to the proof of possible recoupment. After the Brooke decision this seems to be a 
condition for a finding of guilt in relation to predatory pricing in the US. The hope, and 
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probability, of recoupment is, in the US, believed to be the very essence of a predatory 
pricing scheme; without it, a predatory pricing attempt would be futile. If dangerous 
probability of recoupment cannot be proven, unlawful monopoly in breach of section 2 
of the Sherman Act will not occur, and competition will not be compromised – rather 
the opposite.165 Even though probable recoupment is hard to prove, it has been stated 
that the requirement acts as a mechanism to limit the number of predatory pricing 
claims by weeding out those claims that the courts might deem questionable.166  
The EU does not have a similar requirement, indeed it has been explicitly stated that 
proof of recoupment is not necessary.167 Since the probability of recoupment is very 
hard to prove, it can be argued that it is harder to establish predatory pricing in the US 
than in the EU.  
Based on this, it can be concluded that there is in fact a difference between the ban of 
predatory pricing in the US and the EU. In the next chapter, this dissertation will focus 
on the reasons behind these differences, by studying competition law in general, and 
predatory pricing specifically, in a historical and political perspective. 
 
 
4.2. Reasons for the differing treatment of predatory pricing in the EU and the 
US 
4.2.1. Introduction 
The overall objective of competition laws is to protect and promote competition in 
business.168 This can be considered a universal objective, even though the way 
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competition laws are implemented and practiced may vary. Competition laws are 
meant to provide guidance for the different actors, to ensure that their motivation is to 
use resources in an efficient manner. Competition is a means to strive for this overall 
goal of ensuring efficient use of recourses.169 
Although the main objective of competition laws in both EU and in the US is to protect 
competition, and not the competitors, it can seem as if the competitors are protected 
to a greater extent in the EU, for instance because of the lower threshold  for a 
predatory pricing conviction, i.e. without the necessity of proof of possible 
recoupment.170 That EU competition authorities are willing to go particularly far in 
order to protect the smaller actors, was illustrated by the Commission as far back as 
the 1970’s, when stated that it when it reinforced the view of the European Parliament 
that a key factor for the ‘smooth functioning of a modern economy’ is the 
advancement of small and medium sized companies.171 Furthermore, the Commission 
held that it would continue to take measures with the aim of supporting small and 
medium-sized businesses to overcome likely difficulties and profit from the advantages 
which the single market can offer.172 
This focus on protecting the smaller competitors has resulted in criticism of the 
practice of Article 102 TFEU in recent years.173 The reason behind much of this criticism 
is a desire to see a strictly economic approach to the Article 102 TFEU adopted by the 
authorities. The practice of this article can be contrasted with that of Article 101 TFEU, 
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for example, which now allows for a much stricter economic approach. The 
conservative practice of Article 102 TFEU has led to the article being called ‘the last 
steam-powered train of the European competition system.’174 
This conservative approach to Article 102 TFEU can also be traced in its application in 
the EU predatory pricing cases. Although the overall goal of the competition laws in the 
US and the EU is the same, this dissertation has demonstrated that there are, in fact, 
differences in the way predatory pricing is practiced. To ascertain why these 
differences exist, it is worthwhile to examine the political and economic rationales 
behind the different sets of competition laws. 
 
4.2.2. EU Competition law in a historic perspective – ordoliberalism 
It is a well-known perception that European competition law is strongly influenced by 
ordoliberalism.175 Ordoliberalism originates from Germany, and is a particular version 
of European Neo-Liberal thought, which acknowledges the value of an economy based 
on freedom of economic transactions and recognises the necessity of judicial oversight 
in economic policy-making.176  
Some argue that ordoliberal thought was of ‘enormous’ importance in the EU,177 and 
especially so within the area of competition law. In the US, on the other hand, it 
remained virtually unknown.178 A key thought in ordoliberalism is that economic 
freedom is the source not only of prosperity, but also of political freedom.179 It was 
believed that if the economy was allowed to develop without governmental 
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interference, growth would be secured. The pursuit of economic freedom in this regard 
also entails political freedom, and the desire to prevent a government or a dictator 
taking control over the industry.180 
An economy completely free of governmental involvement could however eventually 
allow the establishment of cartels and monopolies. This would be contrary to the 
ordoliberalism’s perception of economic freedom, since economic freedom from an 
ordoliberalistic perspective is a positive freedom, i.e. that all citizens should have the 
opportunity to enter and compete in the market. Cartels and monopolies would 
prevent this opportunity. The solution was thus to find a balance between economic 
freedom and governmental interference. The state would in this way be a guarantor of 
fair competition. This goal, protection of the competitive process, necessarily entailed 
the protection of smaller competitors in the market, and was prioritized at the expense 
of other goals, including economic freedom.181 
The development of ordoliberalism must be viewed in context of the time in which it 
was introduced. The philosophy was developed by the German Freiburg-school in the 
aftermath of World War II, and was strongly influenced by a desire to ensure that a 
government would never again gain as much power as the totalitarian regime during 
the war.182 
There is little doubt that, from the very start, the EU was strongly influenced by the 
ordoliberalism school of thought. The EU competition law was to a large extent, a 
reflection of the approach adopted in Germany with the main focus on securing fair 
competition, and individual and political freedom.183 Today, traces of ordoliberalism 
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can be found in Article 102 TFEU, perhaps most discernibly in the doctrine of dominant 
companies’ special responsibility not to distort competition. This doctrine reduces the 
dominant companies’ right to compete vigorously, as long as it may lead to a negative 
impact on the competition in the relevant market. 184 This train of thought can be 
traced also in the EU practice of predatory pricing, as seen in chapter 2 above. This 
dissertation thus argues that the way the predatory pricing ban is practiced in the EU, 
where the smaller competitors are favoured, can be directly traced to the 
ordoliberalism. 
Taking into consideration the political chaos in Europe in the aftermath of World War II, 
it is not difficult to understand the reasons behind the development of ordoliberalism, 
and the implementation of its ideas into their laws and politics. Some critics have 
however argued that the very foundation upon which this ideology is based is 
outdated, and that the ordoliberalistic way of practicing Article 102 TFEU in general 
should be abolished for a stricter economic approach.185  
This dissertation submits that, despite these criticisms, the article is still practiced in 
this manner due to a principle referred to as ‘the single market imperative’.186 The 
single market imperative is related to the European Union’s overall goal of developing a 
single integrated market. Competition law is strongly influenced by politics, and within 
the EU there are many different countries’ needs and ideas to be addressed. It has 
been claimed that:  
‘a unification of the single market is an obsession of the Community authorities; 
this has meant that decisions have sometimes been taken prohibiting behavior 
which a competition authority elsewhere, unconcerned with single market 
considerations, would not have reached.’187  
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
thought. This issue falls however outside the scope of this dissertation, and the traditional perception 
will therefore be assumed in this dissertation. 
184
 See section 2.1.2. of this dissertation. 
185
 Sher,B., The Last of the Steam-Powered Trains: Modernising Article 82. 
186
 R Whish Competition Law 5ed (2003) at 20 to 21. 
187
 Ibid. at 21. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
42 
 
In order not to step on any toes, and to ensure that different actors from different 
countries will have the opportunity to compete in the single market, the authorities 
seems to be willing to go further to protect smaller actors than in other jurisdictions. 
To further put this in perspective, it can be valuable to assess the US competition law’s 
economic and political influences. US competition law is, in many ways, an opposite of 
EU competition law, and the next section of this dissertation will, focus on how the US 
justifies their system of practicing the ban against predatory pricing. 
 
4.2.3. US competition law in a historic perspective – Chicago School 
As previously stated, the American approach to the ban against predatory pricing, and 
towards anticompetitive conduct in general, seems to have a higher threshold than in 
the EU.188 The almost per se prohibition of certain behavior in the EU, is not to be 
found in the US. Nevertheless, the notion that dominant companies are under more 
scrutiny than non-dominant companies, seems to be a fairly common understanding 
also in the US. This can be read, for instance, in the Supreme Court’s decision in Kodak 
Co, where it was held that that special consideration is required when the defendant in 
question holds ‘substantial market power’. The behaviour of such defendants may be 
viewed as anticompetitive simply due to their monopoly-like position. In other words, 
the same behaviour, when attributed to defendants with less market power, may 
attract little interest from antitrust laws and indeed, may be regarded as furthering 
competition.189 Furthermore, American courts have held that ‘behavior that otherwise 
may comply with antitrust law may be impermissibly exclusionary when practiced by a 
monopolist.’190 Additionally, it has been noted that due to the lack of market 
constraints on the behaviour of a monopolist, it will not be afforded the same level of 
freedom of action enjoyed by a company in a competitive market.’191 
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 See section 4.1. of this dissertation. 
189
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From these cases, one can deduce that the freedom of action of dominant companies is 
narrower also in American competition law. This is must be viewed in accordance with 
the prohibition of the ‘attempt to monopolize’ in paragraph 2 of the Sherman Act. 
Because of the detrimental effect the actions of a dominant company may have, there 
is an opening for the courts to interfere if the action in question could lead to a 
monopoly situation. 
It is however hard to ascertain to what extent this rule is used in US competition law. 
Everything suggests that this rule is a lot narrower in the US than in the EU. This must 
be seen in conjunction with the fact that US courts in general are reluctant to interfere 
in competition and that there is a very high threshold of proof regarding attempted 
monopolization. Contrary to the practice in the EU, a mere theoretical possibility of 
reduced competition is not sufficient for the courts to interfere. This is also the case 
with predatory pricing, where hard evidence of likely recoupment is required.192 
While the hands-on approach undertaken by the EU courts can be explained at least 
partly by its roots in ordoliberalism, US competition law, ‘antitrust law’, must be seen in 
accordance with capitalism and the ideas of the free market. From a competition law 
point of view, an important source of inspiration is the Chicago school of thought. This 
thinking was developed by a group of economists and lawyers, associated with the 
University of Chicago, who promoted the idea that certain actions commonly 
considered to be anticompetitive, could actually promote competition.193 The Chicago 
school is known for promoting the free market, and encouraging the desire of minimal 
government interference. The idea was that competition law should reflect the 
economic model, which involves a Darwinian approach; only the strongest and most 
efficient companies should survive, and it is not the State’s job to protect the weak 
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competitors. The U.S. Supreme Court is said to have applied a Chicago school approach 
in several recent decisions.194 
4.2.4. Conclusions 
Although this was a rather summarized and simplistic account  of the background  to 
the way competition laws are practiced, it is sufficient to illustrate that the ban on 
predatory pricing (and other forms of anticompetitive conduct) in Article 102 TFEU and 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act respectively, can be directly traced to the historical 
influences in each jurisdiction. With regard to predatory pricing, the difference is first 
and foremost related to the requirement of recoupment, which is a necessary 
condition for a finding of guilt in relation to predatory pricing in the US. This can be 
directly traced to the Chicago school of thought and capitalist-based approach to 
competition law; governmental interference should be minimal, and direct interference 
should only happen if there is concrete evidence that the absence of such interference 
will weaken competition and increase the likelihood of a monopolistic situation in the 
market. 
A reason for the hands on approach to the ban against predatory pricing in the EU, and 
the less strict burden of proof for such pricing schemes, is the ordoliberalist influences 
coupled with the single market imperative existing in the EU. Being a coalition of many 
different nations who all expect to compete in the single market, which is one of the 
fundamental overall goals of the EU, it could be argued that the EU has a stronger 
incentive to prevent companies becoming too dominant in a given market, and sees it 
necessary to implement a more hands-on approach when it comes to regulation of the 
market. This is not an issue in the US, and the US government can thus allow a higher 
threshold before such interference is deemed necessary.  
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Keeping in mind that competition law throughout the world is more often than not 
inspired by one of these approaches, it can be interesting to ascertain what the motives 
are for their choice of laws. Chapter 6 of this dissertation will consequently look to 
South African competition law, and how it is practiced there. 
It should not go unmentioned, however, that the ban on predatory pricing is a highly 
contested one. Due to the fact that all of the features are necessary to succeed with a 
predatory pricing arrangement, critics argue that the chances of profiting from a 
predatory pricing scheme are virtually non-existent. It is worth examining the reasons 
for this widespread criticism. Thus the most common criticism of the regulation of 
predatory pricing will be studied in the next section. 
 
5. CRITICISM OF THE BAN ON PREDATORY PRICING 
5.1. Introduction 
Although many jurisdictions have regulations to prevent predatory pricing, this ban has 
not been uncontested and is considered highly controversial among some scholars, 
especially economists.195 Even though criticism of the regulation of predatory pricing is 
not a new trend, it seems to have increased in strength in recent decades, introduced 
by McGee in 1958.196  As will be demonstrated in this chapter, common criticism of a 
predatory pricing ban is that predatory pricing is an irrational pricing strategy, because 
of the unlikelihood of the predator ever being able to recoup its losses after selling 
under cost price. Furthermore, endeavouring to drive competitors out of the market by 
a predatory pricing attempt would be futile because of the number of predatory 
counterstrategies available to the companies subject to attempted predatory pricing 
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 See for instance J McGee ’Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case’(1958) Journal of Law 
and Economics vol. 1 at 137 to 169, H Demsetz ’Barriers to Entry’ (1982) American Economic Review 72, F 
Easterbrook ‘Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies’(1981) University of Chicago Law Review 48, T J 
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schemes. Consequently, banning such behaviour is considered by some to be a fruitless 
exercise as a situation where it is needed will never, or extremely rarely, arise. 
This section aims to summarize the most common criticism of the ban on predatory 
pricing, and the rationale behind this criticism. It should be noted that much of this 
criticism is promoted by US economists in relation to the Sherman Act Section 2, dated 
before the important Brooke case from 1993. It is however believed that much of this 
criticism is still relevant today, and would be applicable also for the EU practice of 
predatory pricing.197 
 
5.2. Common criticism 
McGee is said to be the first economist to think through the logic of predatory pricing 
when analyzing the Standard Oil case of 1911.198 McGee claimed that Standard Oil did 
not engage in any predatory pricing and indeed that it would be irrational for any 
business to attempt to monopolize a market through predatory pricing. DiLorenzo 
embraces McGee’s sentiment,199 and claims predatory pricing is an irrational strategy 
for several reasons, including the following: 
Firstly, predatory pricing strategies are very pricey for those companies attempting to 
undertake it, because the largest company will suffer the largest losses by virtue of 
having the largest volume of sales. Losing a dollar on each one thousand items sold is 
much more costly than losing a dollar on each one hundred items sold.200 Secondly, it is 
very hard to predict the duration of a price war. A long lasting price war will be very 
expensive and to recoup losses will prove difficult, rendering predatory pricing an 
extremely risky business.201 Thirdly, the competitors subject to predatory pricing could 
decide to temporarily shut down and wait for the price to return to profitable levels, 
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leaving the predator with only losses. Alternatively, if the company subject to 
predatory pricing should go bankrupt, other companies may buy their facilities, often at 
below market price, and take up competition against the predator.202 A fourth reason 
predatory pricing is claimed to be an irrational strategy according to DiLorenzo 
concerns the risk that the price war will spread to adjacent markets. This can cause the 
alleged predator’s loss to extend to markets not originally the subject of the predatory 
pricing scheme.203 The biggest loser in a predatory pricing scheme would consequently 
be the predator itself, and a ban on such behaviour would be pointless. 
In addition to the reasons mentioned above, predatory pricing is claimed to be a futile 
strategy, and the ban unnecessary, because there are several predatory 
counterstrategies available to the company who is the subject of the scheme.204 
Further justifying the notion that predatory pricing is an irrational strategy, and a 
predatory pricing ban futile, is the fact that regardless of hundreds of cases based on 
predatory pricing claims, economists and legal scholars have still not been able to 
prove the creation of a monopoly through a predatory pricing scheme.205 The US 
Supreme Court has also noted that ‘the success of such schemes is inherently 
uncertain: the short-run loss is definite, but the long-run gain depends on successfully 
neutralizing the competition’,206 and admitted further that ‘there is a consensus among 
commentators that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely 
successful.’207  
DiLorenzo concludes his article by stating that the ban on predatory pricing is simply 
illogical, since there is no proof of monopolies being created through predatory pricing 
schemes, and that it can only be proven through very theoretical economic models that 
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will never occur in real life. A ban on predatory pricing will in DiLorenzo’s view thus only 
eliminate competitive pricing.208 
As noted earlier, a particularly challenging aspect of predatory pricing is that it can be 
hard to distinguish from desirable competitive conduct promoting competition and 
enhancing consumer welfare. It has been stated that: 
 ‘[f]rom an antitrust perspective, predatory pricing is a particularly difficult 
problem with which to deal. If we are to prevent anticompetitive 
monopolization, it is a strategy that must not be permitted. The paradox 
however, is that such pricing is virtually indistinguishable from the very sort of 
aggressive competitive pricing we wish to encourage.’209  
 
A failed attempt at predatory pricing could thus be good for competition and could 
enhance consumer welfare. 
Moreover, it has also been argued that the laws against predatory pricing might be in 
conflict with fundamental legal values. For instance it has been held that ‘the accused 
must defend himself, not against actual evidence of wrongdoing, but against a theory 
which predicts wrongdoing in the future.’ It can be likened to the criminal law notion of 
‘preventive detection… punishment without proof.’210  
 
5.3. Why is the ban against predatory pricing still practiced? 
Even though criticism of the ban on predatory pricing is seemingly widespread, it 
remains in place in EU and the US, and most other competition law jurisdictions 
influenced by either the EU or the US. There are several conspiracy-like theories as to 
why this is so: firstly predatory pricing litigation is very expensive, which leaves, for 
instance, professionals involved in competition law litigation in favor of the ban;211 The 
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average cost of litigating a predatory pricing case is claimed to be around $30 
million.212 Other theories suggest that predatory pricing is lobbied by ideological anti-
business pressure groups, such as Citizen Action, to discredit capitalism, or 
protectionist groups wanting to protect US businesses from foreign companies 
attempting to establish themselves in the US.213 Furthermore, predatory pricing is 
claimed to be a convenient weapon for companies who do not want to match the 
competitor’s price cutting.214 It has also been argued that many of the defendants tend 
to plead guilty simply because it is cheaper than long lasting trials.215 
Despite this apparent extensive criticism, the EU and the US still enforce a ban on 
predatory pricing. Furthermore, ‘new’ competition law jurisdictions customarily include 
predatory pricing elements in their legislation against illegal pricing strategies. An 
example is South Africa in its new Competition Act.216 The following section will focus 
on the ban on predatory pricing in South Africa, how it is practiced and what the 
influences are for their choice of law. 
 
6. PREDATORY PRICING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
6.1. The Competition Act 
Although South Africa has previously regulated competition through the Maintenance 
and Promotion of Competition Act,217 it is considered to have had little impact and was 
strongly influenced by the apartheid-policies.218 Consequently, South Africa serves as 
an example of a country with relatively new, modern competition laws, namely the 
Competition Act of 1998.219 Like in most modern competition legislation, abuse of 
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dominance, and thereunder predatory pricing, is prohibited.220 Since the Act is 
relatively new, predatory pricing has not yet been properly tested.221 The Act itself is 
thus the most important source of information. The relevant parts of section 8 read: 
‘It is prohibited for a dominant firm to – 
 … 
(c) engage in an exclusionary act, other than an act listed in paragraph (d), if the 
anti-competitive effect of that act outweighs its technological, efficiency or 
other pro-competitive, gain; or 
(d)  engage in any of the following exclusionary acts, unless the firm concerned can 
show technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive, gains which outweigh 
the anti-competitive effect of its act: 
… 
 (iv) selling goods or services below their marginal or average variable cost;’ 
 
6.1.1. Section 8(d) (iv) 
 Of relevance to predatory pricing is section (d)(iv), which prohibits a dominant firm 
‘selling goods or services below their marginal or average variable cost.’ This 
prohibition is however only valid as long as it has an anti-competitive effect which is 
not outweighed by ‘technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive, gains which 
outweigh the anti-competitive effect…’222  
The Act then specifies explicitly that prices lower than its average variable costs may 
imply predatory pricing. This does not however mean that a company pricing below 
average variable costs are in breach of the provision; the cost indicator is merely a 
benchmark in order to decide which types of pricing warrant closer inspection, and a 
potential penalty. 223 
 The explicit reference to the cost-test in the Act is in contrast to both Article 102 TFEU 
in the EU and section 2 of the Sherman Act.  Its inclusion, however, is said to  bring with 
it possible challenges, since developments in international practice which would be 
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desirable for South Africa would require the Competition Act to be amended 
accordingly.224 
From the wording of section 8 (d)(iv), it  appears to advocate an effect-based approach 
where any company selling at below average variable costs automatically undergoes 
scrutiny, without any question of intent. If prices are below average variable costs, 
there seems, like under EU competition law,225 to be a presumption of predatory 
intent.  
Moreover, there is nothing in section 8(d)(iv) regarding proof of recoupment. It has 
however been stated by the Competition Tribunal226 in the matter between Nationwide 
Airlines and South African Airways that: 
‘We would prefer not to insist on recoupment as a requirement as do the U.S. 
courts. For instance a firm operating in multimarkets may use predation as a 
form of investment in a reputation for being a tough competitor. Thus a 
predation strategy in market A would send a message to its competitors not 
only in market A, but also in markets C, D and E. Predation here has a broader 
strategic value beyond any recoupment it may attain in market A.’227 
 
Proof of recoupment is, in other words, not a requirement in South African competition 
law. Practices listed under section 8(d)(iv) are consequently per se anti-competitive. 
This does not mean, however, that there is a conclusive presumption of illegality if 
prices are below average variable cost; it simply means that prices at this level are 
subject to closer scrutiny.228 In other words, the effects of the cost undergo an initial 
study, after which, if found to be anti-competitive, the company alleged to have 
participated in predatory pricing may be liable to a penalty.229 
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6.1.2. Section 8(c) 
Section 8(c) forbids ‘exclusionary acts’ other than those listed in section 8(d) ‘if the 
anti-competitive effect of that act outweighs its technological, efficiency or other pro-
competitive, gain.’  An ‘exclusionary act’ is defined as ‘an act that impedes or prevents 
a firm entering into, or expanding within, a market.’ 230 This is a very general definition, 
which can encompass many types of anticompetitive behaviour. 
The flexible nature of the wording in section 8(c) renders it a one-size-fits-all approach 
to exclusionary conduct. The essential difference, however, is that the complainant in 
section 8(c) cases needs to establish that the anti-competitive conduct ‘outweighs the 
technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gain.’231 The burden of proof must 
thus be considered to be higher than under section 8(d)(iv). The flip side is that the 
complainant is not bound by the prescribed cost formula under 8(d)(iv), provided that 
additional evidence of predatory pricing beyond cost is required.232 The type of 
evidence that this may encompass is undefined, but the South African Competition 
Tribunal has in the case Nationwide Airlines v South African Airways stated that 
recoupment could be an example of such evidence.233  
 
6.2. Cases regarding predatory pricing in South Africa 
Although the case Nationwide Airlines v. South African Airways makes some useful 
remarks concerning predatory pricing, it is claimed not to be completely reliable as it is 
submitted before Commission v. South African Airways 234 The provision has thus not 
been properly tested with regard to predatory pricing,235 although a predatory pricing 
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case is pending in the Competition Tribunal.236 In this case, a predatory pricing charge 
was levied against Media24, for alleged predatory pricing related to the advertising 
rates charged by Media24 in two newspapers in the Goldfield region of Free State, in 
the period from 2005 until 2009.237 
According to the Competition Commission,238 it found through its investigation, that 
Media24 had engaged in exclusionary pricing practices, by way of applying below cost 
advertisement prices.239 Furthermore, the Competition Commission supposedly found 
proof of intent; Media24’s low advertising prices were allegedly part of a scheme to 
eliminate its competitors from the relevant market, and to strengthen Media24’s status 
as an aggressive competitor to scare newcomers away from entering the community 
newspaper market.240 Based on this, the Competition Commission has asked the 
Competition Tribunal to levy Media 24 an administrative fine of 10 per cent of its 
turnover.241 The case has however not yet been decided. 
It is believed that the case will be instrumental in establishing guidelines for the 
practice of predatory pricing, and it has been noted that the Competition Commission 
has likely been anxious to test the new Competition Act’s predatory pricing rules.242 
In conclusion, the ban on preda ory pricing according to the South African Competition 
Act is theoretically clear; prices below average variable costs undergo an effect-based 
examination under section 8(d)(iv). If they are found to be anti-competitive, a penalty 
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may be issued. Prices above average variable costs may still be in breach of the Act, but 
must be considered under section 8(c). Further clarifications or specifications must 
follow from practice.243 
 
6.3. Historical influences and comparison 
Of great advantage to the South African legislators when drafting the new Competition 
Act, was that they had a vast amount of information to use as inspiration, through 
decades of EU and US practice. This section will undertake a short comparison of the 
South African Competition Act and the EU and US practices, and then go on to analyse 
why it is worded as it is.  
The ban on predatory pricing in the South African Competition Act has several links to 
EU competition law and Article 102 TFEU. Firstly, average variable costs are used as a 
benchmark for illegal pricing, in accordance with the findings of the AKZO case.244 
Furthermore, in accordance with EU competition law and in contrast to US antitrust 
law, proof of likely recoupment does not seem to be a prerequisite.245 Proof of 
predatory intent is not necessary under section 8(d)(iv), but is a requirement for cases 
under 8(c). The nature of this proof is however not yet defined, but as previously noted 
the probability of recoupment is likely to serve as such proof.246 Nevertheless, this is 
another contrast to US antitrust law, where specific intent to monopolize must be 
proven under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.247 
In conclusion, South African competition law regarding predatory pricing is seemingly 
the one of the EU. Many of the reasons for this can be traced to its historical and 
political history. When creating competition laws, it is important to cautiously take into 
consideration the particular economy and society for which it is created.248 When 
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drafting the Competition Act, the post-apartheid South African government stated that 
it had to take into consideration the historical legacy of undue economic concentration 
and ownership, and to deal with the ‘collusive practices’ and economic abuse by 
dominant companies,249 and to adapt to the effects of globalization and increased 
international trade.250 It further stated that an essential feature of modern competition 
policy was the need to balance ‘economic efficiency with socio-economic equity and 
development.’251 It has been argued that a country with a history of much state 
ownerships and monopolies in important industries requires a more hands-on 
approach to protect competition.252 US markets are usually prepared to deal with 
monopolies, and the US Supreme Court has consequently decided to intervene in 
competition only when strictly necessary.253  
More so than in the US, it seems that the South African authorities, along with the EU 
authorities, have a more skeptical view of a market’s ability to correct itself. This could 
partly account for why South African authorities chose a competition policy similar to 
the EU rather than that of the US. 
Furthermore, it has been stated that abuse by dominant undertakings can cause a lot 
more damage to developing economies than to developed economies,254 which could 
also explain South Africa’s approach to anticompetitive conduct such as predatory 
pricing. 
 
6.4. Conclusions 
South Africa is a good example of an emerging economy with new competition law 
inspired to a considerable extent by the EU competition law model on predatory 
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pricing. Like the EU, South Africa has chosen an effect-based approach where, 
seemingly, prices below average variable costs lead to a presumption of an intention to 
eliminate competitors. This does not necessarily mean that a company will be found to 
be in violation of section 8(d)(iv), but that it will be subject to a closer inspection. Prices 
above average variable costs may still be found to be predatory, however, according to 
section 8(c), if the complainant can prove that the alleged pricing scheme has a harmful 
effect on competition and is not outweighed by pro-competitive gain. 
The hands-on approach to predatory pricing adopted by the Competition Act, is likely 
to be a result of a desire to be able to more actively steer away from monopolies and 
encourage the growth of small and medium-sized companies. Another reason may be 
the notion of the detrimental effect that abuse of dominance may have on developing 
economies. How predatory pricing will be practiced by the courts, however, remains to 
be seen.  
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Although a contested subject, the ban on predatory pricing still has a strong hold in 
modern competition law, with the EU and the US seen as the most dominating 
approaches. As this dissertation has demonstrated, there are some differences 
regarding the ban on predatory pricing in the EU and the US. One key difference is that 
the EU operates with a cost test, where prices below average variable costs imply a 
presumption of predatory pricing. The US has no such presumption, and a company is 
only found to be in violation of the predatory pricing ban if a likelihood of recoupment 
can be proven. The likelihood of recoupment is by many, especially economists, 
considered to be the key reason for which a company would embark on a predatory 
pricing scheme, and without it the strategy would be futile. The EU Court has 
nevertheless explicitly rejected the likelihood of recoupment as a requirement for 
being convicted of predatory pricing in EU competition law. 
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The reasons behind the choice of predatory pricing law in the respective jurisdictions, 
and the reasons for the above mentioned differences, can be attributed to historical, 
political and economic influences in that jurisdiction. The major influence behind the 
more hands-on approach taken by the EU can be traced to ordoliberalism, an ideology 
focusing on a positive freedom where everyone should have the opportunity to enter 
and compete in the market. Another, and closely related influence on the EU’s 
approach, seems to be what has been called the single market imperative. Being a large 
union consisting of many different countries, it is desirable that companies from all 
countries should be able to establish themselves and compete in the common market. 
The US approach, on the other hand, seems to be strongly influenced by capitalism and 
the Chicago School thought, trademarked by as little governmental interference as 
possible, and only where strictly necessary. Consequently, the US has a stronger belief 
in the market’s ability to self-correct. 
Lastly, as demonstrated by this dissertation, the ban on predatory pricing in the 
relatively new South African Competition Act serves as an example of a jurisdiction 
influenced by, in this case, the EU approach. This is likely to be the case in most 
developing countries, because of the particularly detrimental effects abuse of 
dominance and monopolies can have on such countries.  
Overall, a more hands-on approach such as that employed by the EU, may be more 
desirable, and generally better suited for developing countries as it promotes the 
growth of small and medium sized companies which, in turn ensures healthy 
competition. 
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